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Introduction
The majority of specialized skills training (known as class "A" and "C" schools) in the United States Navy has traditionally been provided in a classroom setting by instructors in Navy schoolhouses. The growing cost of training and concerns that future training demand would exceed capacity, led to an Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT) in 2000. The ERNT group recommended using new training technologies to meet future demands while reducing training costs and time (United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations, 2001) . 1 Based, in part, on these recommendations, the U.S. Navy implemented Computer Based Training (CBT) in 2003, expecting that CBT would increase training capacity and reduce the time and cost of training, while maintaining training quality. 2 While it seems reasonable that CBT may lower costs and maintain quality for relatively simple tasks, it may not be as effective for specialized, knowledge-intensive skills. In 2009, the Naval Inspector General found that although CBT did reduce training time relative to the A and C schools, it may not have adequately prepared sailors for their initial duty assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggested that sailors trained with CBT did not ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = -432 -possess the required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tools (KSATs) to perform their duties effectively (Ewing, 2009; Naval Inspector General, 2009) . Initial evidence also suggests that the use of CBT may have transferred these costs to the operational fleet (Gibson, 2012) . To understand the operational cost impact of CBT we need to know whether CBT reduced the overall cost of operations and maintenance, including on-the-job training, unscheduled maintenance actions, and the length of repairs for systems requiring intensive education and training.
In this study, we examine the impact of CBT on a single system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar 3, to determine whether CBT significantly altered fleet maintenance costs, actions, and training requirements for this system. If CBT has effectively trained personnel, then costs, labor hours, and corrective maintenance actions should either remain constant or decline. On the other hand, if CBT is an ineffective replacement for traditional 'hands-on' training, then, after controlling for other factors, costs, labor hours, and corrective maintenance actions should increase. We recognize that focusing on one system will limit the inferences about CBT's effect, however, we maintain that these inferences will still of be interest to practitioners and policymakers alike.
The next section briefly discusses the Navy's traditional and computer based training. The third section describes the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system and the data used in this study. The fourth section analyzes whether CBT has affected maintenance costs, actions, or time. The last section concludes and offers directions for future research.
Navy Training
U.S. Navy sailors receive training throughout their careers. Once a recruit has completed basic training, he or she will attend specialized skill training in an occupational specialty or "rating." In-rate training begins in a class "A" school, 4 then, depending on the rating, a sailor may also attend additional in-rate training in a "C" school. 5 After completing school training, the sailor is assigned to an initial duty station, where training will continue "on-the-job" as he or she gains real world experience in their specialized skill. Additionally, sailors can expect to receive general military training in topics ranging from electrical safety to suicide prevention.
Until the early 2000s, the navy had conducted in-rate training in a traditional schoolhouse setting using more experienced sailors (subject matter experts) to instruct new sailors. These instructors have practical experience with the work and responsibilities of newly rated sailors and can supplement classroom material with anecdotes and tips from their own career experiences (Hall & Freda, 1982; Naval Inspector General, 2009 ).
In addition to lectures, sailors reinforce their understanding of the material through hands-on practice on the same equipment they will use and maintain in the Fleet, and are ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = -433 -asked to troubleshoot malfunctions in a controlled environment. Because the instructors are observing and interacting with the students in person, the delivery of material (lecture or practical application) can be tailored to improve the students' level of comprehension.
The introduction of CBT in the class A schools has considerably altered the nature of instruction. Using a personal computer, sailors can progress through learning modules at their own pace or work together in groups to complete the course material (Barker, 2010) . There are periodic knowledge assessments throughout the module, followed by a comprehensive evaluation at the end. In both self-paced or group-driven CBT, the navy has replaced instructors with facilitators who are primarily concerned with maintaining order in the classroom, monitoring student progress, and providing technology assistance. Facilitators do not provide instruction or answer questions related to the course content. The removal of instructors from the classroom may have a detrimental effect on learning for those students who cannot grasp the material on their own.
In 2010 GAO noted that the fleet had concerns over the level of knowledge that sailors and officers have received through CBT (GAO, 2010) . In fleet interviews, some commands reported that specialty qualification time was nearly double what it had been before the CBT's introduction (Naval Inspector General, 2009 ). Unfortunately, the navy has focused on the cost of training and has not developed metrics to examine training outcomes, potentially reducing readiness (GAO, 2010; Novak, 2010) .
The AN/SQQ-89(v) Sonar System
In this study we examine the effect of CBT on a single navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system. We selected the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system because it is fielded throughout the operational fleet before and after the implementation of CBT with relatively consistent manning. The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare combat system is an integrated network of sonar systems designed to search, detect, classify, and engage ASW threats (Lockheed Martin, 2009 ). The system is currently installed on CG-47 class cruisers, DDG-51 class destroyers, and FFG-7 class frigates. The AN/SQQ-89(v) employs a variety of sensors that can transmit and receive acoustic data to detect and classify threats (Johns, 1998) .
The AN/SQQ-89(v) is maintained and operated by sonar technicians (STGs). All sailors selected for this duty attend STG A school. At A school they learn the basic principles of oceanography and sound. Following A school, STGs who are strictly operators report to a Sonar Operator course, while maintainers attend C school, where they learn the technical skills required to maintain the equipment present on their reporting ship (Navy Personnel Command, 2012).
Analysis & Results
To test the hypothesis of whether the introduction of CBT significantly influenced system maintenance and operation we define three dependent variables of interest: Organization Parts Costs (OrgParts), Corrective Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance Actions (OrgActions), and Organization Labor Man-Hours (Orghours). If CBT does not detract from sailor ability, then CBT should have no (or negative) impact on the dependent variables. If, however, CBT fails to adequately prepare sailors for operating and maintaining these systems to the degree of traditional training, then there should be an increase in parts costs, maintenance actions, and man-hours.
We define Computer Based Training (CBT) as a dummy variable that is 0 before 2004 and 1 afterwards and introduce several control variables: billets authorized for enlisted ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = -434 -grades E-1 to E-6 (BAE); the Navy Manning Plan for enlisted personnel in grades E-1 to E-6 (NMPE); number of enlisted in grades E-1 to E-6 currently on board (COBE); and the number of days underway in a given fiscal year (UW). A matrix Z includes the radar variant, radar's installation year, type of ship, and homeport location. We employ panel data and thus specify the general estimation form as follows:
( 1) where and denote the unobservable individual ship and time effects, respectively. The term uit is a random walk. The subscripts and denote ship and time period, respectively.
To examine the hypothesized influence of CBT on AN/SQQ-89(v) parts costs, maintenance man hours, and maintenance actions, we select those variants on board prior to and following CBT's introduction into the A and C schools. Of the 15 possible variants, we utilize data on five variants for the empirical analysis from FY 1999 through FY 2010. Our final data set contains 526 observations on 68 ships from FY 1999 to FY 2010. Table 1 presents the 68 ships that have these variants onboard.
We present results from pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators, explicitly assuming that CBT is exogenous to the dependent variables; as CBT is a policy decision, this is a reasonable assumption. We find that CBT's use has adversely influenced the parts costs, actions, and labor hours associated with operating and maintaining the AN/SQQ-89(v). This result is consistent when we control for the type of ship, radar variant, homeport, and unobservable ship and time characteristics. These results suggest that the navy has traded an explicit training cost for an obscured cost in terms of parts, maintenance actions, labor hours, and readiness.
Our analysis suggests that using CBT increases Organizational Parts Costs by approximately $4,971 per year at the 1% level of significance (Table 4) . For a given system on a ship, this suggests a 20 to 50% increase in maintenance costs over time. We also find that CBT increases Corrective Maintenance Actions by approximately 32 per year at the 1% level of significance (Table 5) . For a given system on a ship, this suggests a significant percentage increase in maintenance actions. Finally, we estimate that introducing CBT inflates the number of Organization Labor Hours by 730 hours at the 1% level of significance (Table 6 ).
Our results support the anecdotal arguments that CBT negatively impacts sailor performance on ships, affecting parts costs, maintenance actions, and maintenance labor hours. While limited to one system, this result suggests that the navy has reduced the cost of labor and equipment in schoolhouses at the expense of operational cost and effectiveness (parts, maintenance, and labor hours) on board ships. Further research is important to understand whether these adverse impacts are present in different systems.
Conclusions and Future Research
In 2001, ERNT released its report, Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy Training Final Report, which led to a major overhaul in the U.S. Navy's training practices, including the use of CBT in A and C schools. Anecdotal evidence from the Fleet suggested that the quality of training received by sailors through CBT was not as good as the training received in traditional schoolhouses.
In this study, we focus on a single navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, to examine the effects of the conversion to CBT on maintenance. Controlling for the navy's planning for manning the system, the number of billets authorized, and the number of ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = -435 -personnel on board, we find that CBT adversely impacted costs, actions, and maintenance hours. These preliminary results provide, for the first time in the literature, empirical evidence CBT's negative impact with respect to the U.S. military.
The estimation of (1) raises several econometric issues including serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and the possibility of ship and time-specific effects. We will explore whether our results are fragile to the choice of estimator in future research. Future research should also explore whether CBT has affected other systems in a similar manner. This question is of direct policy and financial interest to the navy; navy expenditures may rise from increases in costs and actions. 6 For further discussion of the ship types and sonar types, please see (Gibson, 2012 
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